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6The Macroeconomics of the Unofficial Foreign
Exchange Market in Tanzania
Daniel Kaufmann and Stephen A. O'Connell
An active parallel foreign exchange market has ex- dow accounted for roughly 40 percent of import
isted in Tanzania since the early 1970s. The licenses issued in 1988. Unoffidal estimates suggest
characteristics of the market have varied over time in that the share of own-funded imports in total imports
response to economic shocks and the evolving policy is even larger perhaps significantly exceeding one
regime, with savingand portfoliodecisionsfeaturing half.3 Given these orders of magnitude, it is clearly
importantly in some periods and illegal trade trans- critical in the current policy context to have an un-
actions in others. At present, the market is very derstanding of the parallel foreign exchange market
extensive, with both trade and financial transactions in Tanzania.
playing important roles. The second section begins with a brief summary of
This paper analyzes the macroeconomics of the major policy developments since Independence. We
parallel foreign exchange market in Tanzania. It fo- then provide a detailed overview of macroeconomic
cusses on the following questions: What factors led developments in Tanzania since 1967, concentrating
to the emergence of an unofficial market? What fac- on the external sector and the evolution of the pre-
tors determine the premium between the unofficial mium on foreign exchange in the parallel market. In
and official exchange rates? What are the linkages the third section, we specify and estimate a simple
between the unofficial foreign exchange market and empirical model of the parallel premium using an-
the rest of the economy? The answers to these ques- nual data from 1966 to 1988. The fourth section sum-
tions have important implications for macroeco- marizes the key conclusions and indicates our
nomic management in Tanzania and provide essen- agenda for future work.
tial background for consideration of such current
policy issues as unification of the foreign exchange Economic Structure and Policy*. An Overview
markets.
While the exact size of the unofficial foreign ex- Figure 6-1 shows quarterly movements in the par-
change market is (by its very naturel) difficult to allel premium on the U.S. dollar in Tanzania since
judge, a recent policy measure legalizing one key 1970 (table 6-1 gives annual observations back to
dimension of the market provides an unambiguous 1966). Data for the unofficial rate are from the World
indication of current orders of magnitude. Starting in Currency Yearbook, supplemented after 1984 by a
mid-1984, individuals with access to unofficial for- small survey carried out in Dar es Salaam by Mali-
eign exchange were allowed to obtain import li- yamkono and Bagachwa (1990).4 The figure also
censes without accounting for the source of their shows the official exchange rate against the dollar,
funds.2 Based on official figures, the own-funds win- periods of discrete devaluation against the relevant
50
The Maoeconomics of the Unofficial Forigxn Exchange Market in Tanzania
Figure i-I. Tanzania: Parallel Premium vs. Official Exchange Rate, 1970:3 - 1989.4
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Note: Stars (*) denote discrete devaluations of the official rate.
Source: World Bank data.
currency basket are identified with asterisks. Table tion; the activities of trade finance were taken over
6-2 provides a list of currency realignments over the by the National Bank of Commerce after nationaliza-
sample. tion of the banking sector.
The parallel premium shows substantial vari- Despite the abrupt and major institutional
ationsover timeinboth trend and level. BetweenJuly changes, real GDP per capita grew at an average
1970 and March 1986, the premium increased at an annual rate of 5.2 in the period from 1967 to 1973.
average rate of nearly 1 percentage point per month; With the implementation of the Second Five-Year
from April 1986 to the end of the sample (the period Plan (1969 to 1974), the gross investment rate rose to
of the Economic Recovery Program), it declined at a above 20 percent of GDP (from an average of 14.3
rate of over4percentagepoints permonth.5 Fluctua- percent between 1964 and 1968), and Tanzania
tions around trend, which are often large and persist- achieved significant improvements in the social sec-
ent, occur throughout the sample in response to tors, particularly in education and health. Structural
changes in the macroeconomic and regulatory envi- weaknesses were already beginning to emerge, how-
ronment. ever, which would become more pronounced and
affect future economic performance. Agricultural ex-
1967 To 1973 ports began to stagnate in volume terms in the late
1%0s. Domestic savings performance reached a peak
After the Arusha Declaration of 1967, the Govern- of 18.1 percent of GDP in 1970 but fell to 15 percent
ment rapidly consolidated its control over all major by 1973, and then dropped as low as 8 to 9 percent of
aspects of the economy. In the external sector, the GDP in the crisis years 1974-75. The widening gap
eight major private import-export firms were nation- between investment and domestic savings was re-
alized and replaced by the State Trading Corpora- flected in the external accounts: between 1970 and
51
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Table 6-1. Exchange rates and the parallel premiwn, 1966-1989
Official exchange rate Unofficial exchange rate Paralld premium
TShs/$ (percentage)
Period (avg.) (eop) (avg.) (eop) (avg.) (eop)
1966 7.14 7.14 8.6 8.6 20.4 20.4
1967 7.14 7.14 8.7 8.8 21.8 23.2
1968 7.14 7.14 85 8.3 19.0 16.2
1969 7.14 7.14 8.7 9.1 21.8 27.4
1970 7.14 7.14 10.1 105 40.8 46.3
1971 7.14 7.14 11.6 15.0 62.2 110.0
1972 7.14 7.14 15.2 15.4 113.0 115.6
1973 7.02 6.90 14.5 13.5 106.9 94.9
1974 7.14 7.14 13.5 13.0 885 96.0
1975 7.41 8.26 20.6 25.0 176.5 202.5
1976 8.38 8.32 21.9 20.4 161.8 145.1
1977 8.27 7.96 21.5 15.1 159.1 89.1
1978 7.69 7.41 13.1 11.8 69.8 58.5
1979 8.25 8.22 12.0 13.5 45.2 64.2
1980 8.19 8.18 21.0 265 156.6 223.9
1981 8.29 8.32 27.6 24.4 232.7 192.6
1982 9.33 9.57 32.6 29.2 247.5 204.7
1983 11.26 12.46 39.6 50.0 252.8 301.4
1984 15.51 18.11 55.9 70.0 259.5 286.6
1985 17.35 16.50 100.8 150.0 487.6 809.1
1986 34.26 51.72 165.0 180.0 478.0 248.0
1987 65.62 83.72 180.0 190.0 178.3 127.0
1988 100.39 125.00 210.0 230.0 110.2 84.0
1989 144.47 190.00 254.2 300.0 76.7 57.9
Source Official exchange rates: IMF, Intemational Financial Statistics, Unofficial exchange rates: World Currency Yearbook (formerly
Pick's CurrencyYearbook) for monthly rates from July, 1970 to January,1984; unofficial survey b Maliyamkono and Bagachwa at University
of Dares Salaam for monthly rates from February 1984 to November 1989; our estimate for December, 1989. Unofficial rates before July,
1970 are based on occasional observations reported in Pick's Currency Yearbook.
1973, the trade deficit was already 6 or 7 percent of demand, stagnating exports, and capital flight. Tan-
GDP, as compared with balanced trade in the mid zania's first (minor) balance of payments crisis oc-
and late 1960s. curred in 1970-71, when international reserves fellby
Under the Currency Board system, balance of pay- 25 percent between the end of 1969 and the end of
ments problems had been virtually nonexistent in 1971. Relative to the risingimportbill, the decline in
East Africa. The currency issue of the East African reserves was more drastic, with import coverage
Currency Board was backed virtually 100 percent by dropping from 4 months to less than 2 months over
sterling so that the currency stock moved one-for- the period. The Government weathered the crisis by
one with the sterling reserves of the Board (see New- tightening import controls, extending exchange con-
lyn 1967).6 Proponents of an independent central trols to Kenya and Uganda, and mobilizing inflows
bank viewed the introduction of the Bank of Tanza- of concessionary financing (Green, Rwegasira and
nia in 1966 as an opportunity to move to a less van Arkadie 1980).
conservative monetary policy more in tune with the The use of direct controls for balance of payments
country's ambitious development program. adjustment was consistent with the ongoing transi-
Tanzania's balance of payments performed favor- tion to socialism and the Government's already-es-
ably in the first three years of operation of the Bank tablished aversion to exchange rate devaluation;7 it
of Tanzania, with gross reserves rising steadily from was institutionalized with the introduction of for-
1966 to 1969. Serious pressures first began to emerge eign exchange budgeting in 1970/71. A domestic
in the early 1970s, in response to the rise in internal credit planning apparatus was introduced in the
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Table 6-2. Major party changes since 1970 financed by increased aid and capital inflows in 1974
Period Change and 1975, as the government froze wages and re-
stricted imports other than oil and food in an attempt
July 1973 revaluation 3.4% to manage the short-term situation. Intemational re-
January 1974 devaluation 3.4% serves fell by nearly 70 percent in 1974, and for most
October 1975 switch to SDR and devaluation 16% of 1975 covered only about three weeks of imports.
January 1979 switch to undisclosed basket, and The Government's management of the 1974-75 cri-
devaluation 10% sis represented a conscious decision not to sacrifice
March 1982 devaluation 10% the development program in the face of adverse cir-
June 1983 devaluation 20% cumstances (Green, Rwegasira and van Arkadie
June 1984 devaluation 36% (1980). In practice, this meant increased reliance on
June 1986 devaluation 55% and initiation of aid and capital inflows. Pressures on the external
weekly crawl accounts were eased dramatically in 1976-77 with the
November 1988 devaluation 23% recovery of domestic food production and the arrival
December 1989 devaluation 29% of the coffee boom. By the end of 1977, reserves were
at the unprecedented level of nearly 5 months of
imports. Fiscal pressures were eased as well, since the
same year, with the intention of implementing the Government chose to tax away most of the windfall
Government's development priorities and influenc- in export proceeds.
ing the overall growth of credit. The weak underlying external situation emerged
With the advent of the semi-annual foreign ex- dramatically in 1978, however, when the govern-
change plan, trade policy (as represented by the set ment loosened import constraints in response to the
of import quotas implicit in foreign exchange alloca- boom-related inflow of foreign reserves (as it had
tions) became an endogenous function of foreign done in 1973).8 As imports expanded dramatically,
exchange revenues. With the exception of a brief the coffeeboom collapsed; the current account deficit
period immediately following the Arusha Declara- rose to above 15 percent of GDP in 1978 and gross
tion, the parallel premium in Tanzania was below 30 reserves fell by nearly $200 million over the course of
percent until the 1970-71 mini-crisis. From the expe- the year. External arrears appeared for the first time
rience of other countries, a premium of this magni- in 1978.
tude is consistent with the operation of binding capi- The parallel premium fluctuated dramatically
tal controls in a stable and otherwise relatively un- over the 1974 to 1978 period, rising to above 250
distorted macroeconomic environment. With the percent by the end of 1975, and nearly as high again
emergence of the crisis, however, the premium in the first half of 1977, and then falling sharply
moved above 50 percent. By the end of 1971, follow- starting in the third quarter of 1977. These move-
ing the extension of exchange controls to Kenya and ments reflecta numberof macroeconomic influences,
Uganda, it exceeded 100 percent. While these short- including increased savings incentives associated
run movements can plausibly be attributed to inten- with the temporary coffee boom revenues (see
sified desires for capital flight, the premium did not Bevan, Collier and Horsnell 1985) and the foreign aid
return to its previous low level after the bulk of the inflows and import liberalization in 1978. The 1977
nationalizations had been accomplished. This cor- breakup of the East African Community was a fur-
roborates ourobservation (see also Green, Rwegasira ther influence; in that year, the Tanzanian Govern-
and van Arkadie (1980)) that although the 1970-71 ment closed its border with Kenya, which probably
mini-crisis was successfully contained by short-run raised the cost of illegal trade between the two coun-
measures, the crisis itself was an indication of the tries substantially.9
emergence of more fundamental imbalances.
1979 To 1984
1974 To 1978
This was a period of fiscal and external crisis and
The 1974 to 1978 subperiod began with the coun- cumulative economic collapse. Soon after the ill-
try's first serious balance of payments crisis, brought fated import liberalization of 1978, the economy was
on by two years of drought and the first oil shock. hit by the second OPEC oil price increase and the
The crisis exposed some of the longer-term weak- onset of war with Uganda. In contrast to the balance
nesses in economic performance. Large current ac- of payments crises of 1970-71 and 1974-75, when
count deficits (averaging 14 percent of GDP) were Tanzania managed to maintain consumption per
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capita through increased inflows of external capital, shortages were not averted by inflows of illegal imn-
adjustment to the economic shocks of 1978-79 even- ports financed by unofficial foreign exchange and
tually required a substantial cutback in both con- sold at market-clearing prices. Surveys conducted by
sumption and aggregate investment. Bevan et al (1c 90) document that especially in rural
The macroeconomic collapse that unfolded in the areas, goods could not in fact be obtained even
first half of the 1980s has been analyzed carefully by through illegal channels. One reason is that the elabo-
Bevan et al (1990), Ndulu (1987), and others. Starting rate system of cantrols on distribution meant that the
in 1979, the government tightened import controls costs of avoiding detection were extremely high. A
severely, while at the same time raising producer second factor is that the activity of smuggling is
prices for export crops in the hope of improving transport-intensive and therefore subject to the seri-
export incentives. The import compression fell par- ous deterioration of infrastructure that occurred be-
ticularlystronglyon intermediates and consumption ginning in the late 1970s. Illegal activity was further
goods, in line with government and donor priorities discouraged by the 1983 "economic saboteurs" cam-
which remained strongly geared towards the Basic paign during which a large number of businessmen
Industrial Strategy objective of increasing manufac- were jailed (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990).
turing capacity (and over 1978 to 1981, defense). The A concomitant of the shortages that emerged start-
compression of intermediate imports drove down ing in 1979 was that the monetary expansion of that
capacity utilization in the manufacturing sector; to- yeardid not immediatelypushprices up; instead, the
gether with the direct compression of consumer im- velocity of money fell by 40 percent in 1979, and then
ports, this produced a severe shock to the supply of stayed at the lower level until the introduction of the
consumer goods. own-funds scheme and domestic price decontrol in
In an exchange-control regime without domestic 1984. Although the unofficial exchange rate did not
price controls or government control of internal immediately reflect the expansion of real money bal-
trade, a reduction in the supply of consumer goods ances (one would expect a depreciation in the pres-
would be equilibrated by a rise in the domestic rela- ence of portfolio substitution between domestic
tive price of imports and import substitutes (and money and unofficial foreign exchange holdings), it
probably a rise in the real consumption rate of inter- did begin to rise dramatically by the end of 1979.
est, provided the shock were viewed as temporary). During the early 1980s a number of attempts at
In Tanzania, where price controls were pervasive 10 policy reform (e.g., small devaluations) failed to ad-
and a "confinement" policy restricted most domestic dress the keyproblems and did not always obtain the
and foreign trade operations to selected parastatal necessary political support.12 The 1984/85 budget
agencies, the consequence of import compression represented a turning point, and provided the first
was the emergence of widespread shortages of con- indication of a major shift towards pragmatism in the
sumer goods, particularly in rural areas. Moreover, Government's economic management. The ex-
since the government resisted devaluing the ex- change rate was devalued by one-third, parastatal
change rate, the rise in producer prices meant sub- subsidies were cut, an import liberalization program
stantial losses by the exporting parastatals and a was initiated through introduction of the own-funds
corresponding increase in the public sector borrow- import scheme, an export retention scheme was in-
ing requirement and in inflationary pressure.11 Un- troduced allowing exporters to retain a portion of
der the combined pressure of shortages and falling their proceeds to purchase imports, and restrictions
real producer prices, peasants retreated into subsis- on the movement of grain were eased. Simultane-
tence production (Bevan et al 1987, 1990) and, to a ously, cooperatives (which had been abolished in
limited degree, increased smuggling of the export 1976) were reestablished, and took over many of the
crop. functions of the parastatal crop authorities.
The collapse of recorded exports in the early 1980s
was dramatic: exports declined by roughly 10 per- 1985 To Present
cent between 1979/80 and 1981/82, and then by a
further 20 percent in 1983. Against this background This was a period of regime change and gradual
of macroeconomic collapse, the parallel premium recovery. The period from 1985 to the present is one
increased dramatically throughout the third subpe- of gradual economic recovery coinciding with a su-
riod, with only minor and short-lived interruptions tained liberalization of economic policy. In mid-1986,
in response to devaluations of the official rate. Given the Government produced a medium-term 'Eco-
the key role of shortages of consumer goods in exac- nomic Recovery Program." The Economic Recovery
erbating the collapse, it is important to ask why Program aimed at achieving a positive growth rate
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in per capita income, reducing the rate of inflation, portfolio factors in the determination of the parallel
and restoring a sustainable balance of payments po- premium, both in the short run and over time. In
sition. Its main thrust was to reduce distortions and table 6-1, we address this issue using static and dy-
encourage more efficient resource allocation while namic versions of the Dombusch, et al (1983) model
exercisingfiscal and monetaryrestraint. In the public for the parallel premium. The model builds on two
sector, rehabilitation of the transport infrastructure basic relationships. The first is a flow equation in
and support for agricultural production were identi- which the change in private holdings of unofficial
fied as the most urgent priorities. The measures initi- foreign exchange, dF (the unofficial trade balance), is
ated at the time of the 1986/87 budget and continued a function of the incentives for illegal trade, including
thereafter include: (1) significant adjustments in the the parallel premium z, the official real exchange rate
official exchange rate; (2) increases in interest rates, RER, and other variables w:
resulting in positive real interest rates by 1988; (3)
increases in producer prices for export crops; and (4) (6-1) dFt =f (zt, RERt, wt)
a significant reduction in the number of price-con- + +
trolled items.
Both GDP per capita and trade volumes began to We provide a detailed rationale for an equation like
rebound in 1986 after reaching their lowest points in (6-1) below.
1985. Real GDP growth averaged 4percentfrom 1986 The second equation is a portfolio equilibrium
to 1989, with even higher growth evident in the condition in which the allocation of financial wealth
extensive informal sector. The most visible source of between domestic assets M and unofficial foreign
growth has been the agricultural sector, where over- exchange is a function of the uncovered interest par-
all production increased between 4 and 5 percent in ity differential. Letting the notation tyt+1 denote the
both 1987 and 1988, reflecting continued increases in expected value of yt+1 conditional on information
production of foodgrains and some traditional ex- available at time t, the portfolio balance condition is
port crops.
The cornerstone of the Economic Recovery Pro- (6-2) Mt = g (i *t + tdInUt+i -it, xt)(Mt + utFt), g't < 0
gram has been the adjustment of the Tanzanian cur-
rency. Although the devaluation of mid-1984 was where i and i are the foreign and domestic nominal
substantial, it did not represent a fundamental interest rate, respectively, and x is a vector of other
change in the Government's approach to exchange variables affecting portfolio behavior. The uncover-
rate management. The parallel premium continued ed interest paritydifferential measures the difference
its twenty-year rising trend, reaching over 700 per- in expected yields between dollar and TSh-denom-
cent in early 1986, perhaps in anticipation of the inated assets (not including the expected penalty, if
major devaluation and policy shift that accompanied any, associated with holding illegal foreign assets); a
the 1985/86budget and agreementwith the IMF and rise in this differential lowers the desired share of
World Bank. Since March, 1986, the premium has domestic bank deposits and other TSh-denominat-
gradually fallen, reaching roughly 50 percent in the ed assets in the overall portfolio. Other influences on
first half of 1990, a level not experienced since the relative yields, or on the relative liquidity or risk of
early 1970s and briefly following the coffee boom. domestic and foreign assets, are captured by x. An
While a mild premium (e.g., below 30 percent) canbe increase in penalties for violations of exchange or
expected to persist reflecting capital controls, con- capital controls, for example, would simultaneous-
vertibility of the exchange rate for current account ly reduce the expected yield and decrease the liq-
transactions now appears to be a realistic option. uidity associated with illegal foreign exchange ho-
ldings; at the same time, it might well increase the
The Parallel Premium: Some Empirical Results riskiness of dollar assets. The overall effect would be
to lower g for any value of the interest parity dif-
The chronology presented above suggested that a ferential.
variety of forces were at work in determining the Using the identity tlnzt+l = tlnUt+ . tlnEt+i where
parallel premium in Tanzania. In this section, we Uand E are the unofficial and official exchange rates,
present some empirical results and suggest direc- respectively, equation (6-2) yields the following dy-
tions for further work on the determination of the namic equation for the parallel premium:
parallel premium.
One of the key questions emerging from the sec- (6-3) tdlnzt+l = h (Mt / Et, Ft, z t, xt) - (* t+dlntE t+1-i)
ond section is the relative importance of trade and - + +
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Equations (6-1) and (6-3) form a second-order premium to the extent that they lower the share of
dynamic system in which the parallel premium and domestic financial assets in private portfolios or de-
the private stock of foreign exchange evolve together preciate the real exchange rate. In both cases, the
in response to current and anticipated movements in results clearly indicate the need for complementary
the real exchange rate, the domestic asset stock macroeconomic policies, since the effect of a nominal
(measured in foreign exchange), the interest parity devaluation can be nullified by increases in nominal
differential, and the other flow and stock determi- money or domestic prices.
nants, w and x.13 With respect to the long-run effects of the portfol-
It is apparent from equation (6-1) that for fixed io factors, the results are mixed. We cannot reect the
values of the right-hand side variables, the model has null hypotheses that a4 and a5 are simultaneously ze-
a steady state in which the parallel premium is a ro, using standard F-tests. In this sense, the resu- Its
function only of the flow determinants RER and w support the prediction that portfolio factors influ-
(simply set dFt = 0). On the other hand, the portfolio ence the parallel premium in the short run only, and
determinants, by equation (6-3), clearly affect the that the premium is determined by flow factors alo-
parallel premium in the short run. We therefore esti- ne in the long run.17 Taken separately, however, it ap-
mate the following dynamic specification thatallows pears that while changes in real moneybalances have
for separate short and long run effects of both groups no effect in the longrun (i.e., a5 is negligible), changes
of determinants:14 in the interest parity deviation do have a cumulative
effect over a two-year horizon. And when we drop
(6-4) Inzt - a o + a,Inztil+ a2 d (MME)t + a3dIPDt the long-run portfolio effects from the regression
+ a4dRER t + as(84)t-i (columns 2 and 4), the overall performance deterio-
+ a6IPDEVt.l+ a7RER_1 rates noticeably. Caution is clearly appropriate in
interpreting the results regarding dynamics.
Table 6-1 gives the results of OLS and instrumental While the hypothesis of no serial correlation of the
variables estimation of equation (6-4). The data are residuals cannot be rejected at the marginal5 percent
given in table 6-2.15 We use the ex post interest parity significance level based on the Box-Pierce statistic,
deviation as a proxy for the expected deviation, and both the Durbin-Watson (which is biased towards 2
apply instrumental variables to handle the implied given the lagged dependent variable) and the Box-
measurement error.16 For the value of domestic as- Pierce statistic suggest that further work on the dy-
sets, we use M2 (= Currency + Demand Deposits + namic specification and/or estimation with a serial
Time Deposits). The real exchange rate is a trade- correlation correction maybe in order.
weighted index of bilateral real exchange rates with
the eight major trading partners. Extending the Analysis
Given the short sample and the uncertain quality
of the data, the basic results (columns 1 and 3) are The discussion above emphasized that in an ex-
quite satisfactory. They give strong support to the change control regime, the parallel premium is
conclusion that both trade and portfolio factors are jointly determined with the domestic price of im-
at work in determining the premium on unofficial ports, since the marginal supply of imported goods
foreign exchange in Tanzania. The short-run effects enters the country through smuggling and underin-
of the various determinants, given by a2 - an, are all voicing. A rise in the official allocation of foreign
of the expected signs: a rise in the interest parity exchange, for example, will increase the total supply
deviation or an increase in the real value of domestic of imports, thus reducing the domestic price of im-
financial assets leads to portfolio substitution tow- ports relative to the world prices and depreciating
ards unofficial foreign exchange, raising the prem- the real exchange rate; simultaneously, it will reduce
ium; a real appreciation shifts incentives away from the value of illegal imports, reducing the flow de-
export smuggling and towards import smuggling, mand for foreign exchange in the parallel market and
raising the premium. An appreciation of the real exc- lowering the parallel premium.
hange rate raises the parallel premium in both the To incorporate these considerations, we first spec-
short run and the long run, as predicted by the mod- ify flow equilibrium in the parallel foreign exchange
el; moreover, since a4 and a7 > 0, an unanticipated market morecarefullyand then takecareof endogen-
shock to the real exchange rate produces an 'over- eity of the real exchange rate. The flow demand for
shooting' of the parallel premium in the short run. foreign exchange comes from two sources: (1) dire-
The results also support the conclusion that nomi- ctly smuggled imports, M5, or imports through the
nal devaluations are capable of lowering the parallel own-funds windcw, M°"n; and (2) imports brought
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in through the official window, but underinvoiced to change, the value of reported imports (and therefore
avoid payment of tariff. In the underinvoicing case, the base of the import tariff) is fixed in advance, so
we denote the officially reported value of imports that changes in tariffsaffectoverall profitsbutnot the
and the amount by which these imports are underin- optimal degree of underinvoicing.
voiced by V°ff and VU, respectively. In a strict foreign We include the tariff rate as an argument in the
exchangebudgetingregime, V'ffisnotachoicevaria- underinvoicing function to capture the fact that
ble, since it equals the official allocation of foreign ex- while the overall allocation of official foreign ex-
change for imports. NoteVu need not be positive; im- hange may be determined in advance, individual
ports maybe overinvoiced as a way of obtaining off- traders may view themselves as having some inf-
icial foreign exchange for sale on the parallel market. luence over their own allocation of foreign exchange.
To derive the flow demand for foreign exchange, For these traders, cost-minimizingbehavior requires
consider first the case where there is no own-funds trading off the marginal benefit of an additional dol-
scheme, so that the marginal supply of imports into lar of underinvoicing, which is tm, against the mar-
theeconomyisthroughsmugglingandunderinvoic- ginal cost, which is z plus the marginal increase in
ing. Suppose (1) that the marginal cost of smuggling expected penalties. Underinvoicing will occur on
a unit of imports rises with the amount smuggled, those goods for which tm exceeds z; if tm is less than
and is denominated in the good being smuggled (cf. z, the good will be overinvoiced. Similar behavior is
Bhagwati and Hansen (1974)); and (2) that the cost of exhibited by individuals who illegally import either
underinvoicing is denominated in foreign exchange a given quantity of goods (e.g., a single car or ma-
and is an increasing function of the distance of v = chine tool) or goods withoutwell-developed markets
V1A/Voff from zero (i.e., an increase in fraud in either within the country, such as specialized spare parts.
direction raises marginal costs; cf. Macedo (1987)). Cost minimization yields an amount of smuggling
Then letting WS and wu be variables like the govern- and underinvoicing that is an increasing funcfion of
ment enforcement effort that increase the marginal the tariff rate and a decreasing function of the parallel
costs of smuggling and underinvoicing, respectively, premium (and zero for tm = z).
the flow demand for foreign exchange for illegal Finally, notice that the effect on FD of an increase
imports takes the form.18 in officially recorded imports is uncertain, since it
depends on the sign of v, i.e., on whether imports
(6-5) FD = Pm Ms + Vu = p*Ms (q,z,tm,wIn) through the official window arebeingunderinvoiced
+ - + - or overinvoiced on average. If the average domestic
+ vu (qz,tm,wM)VOff price premium q isbelow the parallel premium, how-
+ - + -? ever, the overall incentive will be to overinvoice, so
= FD ( q, z, tm,V°f, Pm, wm, wm), that v is negative; in this case a rise in Vff will de-
+ - + +? + - -? crease the flow demand for foreign exchange, and a
rise in wmu will increase it.
where q = (Pm-EP m)/EP m is the premium of the The flow supply of foreign exchange, FS, comes
domestic price of imports over the world price at the from direct export smuggling in amount Xs and from
official exchange rate, tm is the import tariff rate, and underinvoicing of exports officially reported to the
z = (U-E)/E is the parallel premium. authorities, X". The amount of underinvoicing of
For smugglers or for underinvoicers with fixed exports is given by xu = xu(t,x)[X(RER&ODA) -XS1,
individual foreign exchange allocations, the optimal where X(RERx,ODA) is total export supply as a fu-
illegal behavior embodied in equation (6-5) is nction of the real official exchange rate for exports
straightforward: smuggle and/or underinvoice and the level of official development assistance. We
those goods whose price on the domestic market is use the latter as a proxy for the demand for exports
highenough to offset theparallel premium (i.e., those of housing services and tourism, two major channels
goods for which q > z), and overinvoice the rest (i.e. of illegal exports in Tanzania.20 Both Xs and xu de-
those for which q < z).19 pend positively on the parallel premium and on the
Notice that the tariff rate does not affect the de- gap between the domestic price of exports and the
mand for foreign exchange of these agents, since it world price at the official exchange rate, tx. Again
does not affect their marginal incentives for illegal letting w8 and wu be variables like government en-
activity once q and Vff are given. This is obvious for forcement efforts that increase the marginal cost of
smugglers, who avoid tariffs altogether; for underin- smuggling and underinvoicing, respectively, we
voicers who receive a fixed allocation of foreign ex- have:
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(6-6) FS = P x (x$ (tx,a,wx) + x"(tx,z,wsU) {X( t,z,wu) margin; these prices are determined by overall ab-
+ + - + + - sorption, A, and by supply conditions. In the case of
[X (RERx,ODA) - Xs (tx,z,wsv ) } nontradeds, an upward-sloping supply curve comes
- + from standard general equilibrium considerations
= FS (tx,z,RERxODA,Pxw,u, wx) (resources must be attracted from other sectors, in-
++ - + +- - cluding the export sector, to increase the supply of
nontradeds); for the case of imports under exchange
Notice that there are two sources of increases in tx, control, the marginal supply of imports comes from
given the world price of exports: (1) decreases in smugglingandunderinvoicing, sothatqisafunction
producer prices paid by marketingboards without a of tm and z as well as A.22 Substituting for q and P. in
change in the exchange rate (e.g., through higher equation (6-9), we have
overhead margins being charged by marketing para-
statals, or through a policy decision to tax exports (6-10) {z = Zm (tm,tx,,MOftA,P * m,P* ,ODA,w,FS- FD)
more heavily); (2) devaluations in the official ex- +? - -? + + - - +
change rate that are not passed on to producers.
Notice also that in Tanzania, the relevant "world Finally, we need models for A, Voff and FS-FD. In
price" for key export commodities may in fact be the the Tanzanian context of foreign exchange rationing,
producer price being paid in neighboring countries VIff is a policy variable. We can therefore either take
(e.g., the producer price for arabica coffee in Kenya). it as exogenous or specify a "reaction function" in
Taking equations (6-5) and (6-6) together gives us which the amount of foreign exchange allocated for
the following version of equation (6-1) (we consoli- imports depends on other variables. Based on actual
date the w's into a single vector for notational con- Tanzanian experience as outlined in the second sec-
venience): tion, one possibility is to have VIff endogenously
respond to the reserves position in the previous pe-
(6-7) z = z (q,tm,txRERx7VODA,P*,P*xwwFS-FD) riod, and to current official exports and aid receipts:
++ -+ -? - + - +
(6-11) v?ff =f (VA, (Rt_--Rt.2),Px (x-x5),ODA
The real exchange rate for exports, RERx, is the + + + +
ratio of the consumerprice index to theprice received
by exporters (we use PPx, the producer price for where Rt-l is reserves at the end of period t-1.i In
agricultural exports):21 this case, equation (6-11) becomes
Da 1)1-a ~~~~~~~(6-12)
(6-8) RERx = 1+Ea cc (Px/fp ) I-a Z = Z (tm,tx,Vt-l,Rt-l-Rt-2,A,Pm,Px,ODA,WwFS-FD)
PPX +?-? -? + +- +
(PMP,) = RERx (q, t, P,/EPtP1Z/P,),
+ + + + Equation (6-12), together with (6-13), provides a
rich structure for incorporating flow determinants of
Equation (6-7) can therefore be written the parallel premium and analyzing the linkages of
the parallel foreign exchange market with the rest of
(6-9) z = z( q,tmtx, Pn/EPx,Pm;, Px, ODA,V'%,w,S- FD) the economy. Intertemporal considerations, for ex-
+ +? + + - - -? + ample, enter through the determination of A: a com-
modity boom that raises desired absorption will tend
The effect of a rise in tx is uncertain a priori, since to raise the parallel premium by driving up the do-
there are two opposing effects: the real exchange rate mestic relative price of imports and raising the prof-
for exports rises, reducing aggregate export supply, itability of import smuggling; on the other hand, it
while the share of exports that is diverted onto unof- will (i) increase the foreign exchange value of any
ficial channels also rises. The net effect on illegal given volume of smuggled exports, and (ii) rapidly
exports, and thus on z, is an empirical question. feed into higher allocations of foreign exchange
Equation (6-9) contains four potentially endoge- through the official window, with the opposite effect
nous variables: q, PpIEPx, VIff, and dF = FS-FD. Con- on the premium. The net effect on the parallel pre-
sider the relative prices first. Both q and P,IEPx are mium over time is an empirical question, depending
relative prices of goods that are nontraded at the largely on the degree to which the commodity boom
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is perceived as temporary. In the case of the 1976-77 As in the case of a commodity boom, the net effect is
coffee boom, which was clearly the effect of a tempo- an empirical question.
rary supply shock (a frost affecting the Brazilian A major weakness of equation (6-12), in combina-
crop), we would expect a very mild effect on aggre- tion with (6-3), is that it leaves out the government
gate expenditure, and therefore, given the time path budget constraint. It therefore misses the endoge-
of the domestic money stock and official exchange nous determination of the domestic moneystockand
rate, a tendency for the parallel premium to be driven the official exchange rate. This is an important poten-
down by the valuation effect on smuggling volumes tial direction for extensions. In the commodity boom
and the endogenous trade liberalization. case, for example, the commodity revenues would be
received by the private sector primarily in domestic
Aid Inflows. With respect to an increase in Official currency, since the bulk of the export crop is mar-
Development Assistance (ODA), holding desired ab- keted through official channels. In the absence of
sorption constant, the effect should be to lower the sterilization, portfoliobalance considerations would
premium, both by increasing the flow supply of for- then tend to push the unofficial exchange rate up in
eign exchange onto the parallel market and by pro- the short run, counteracting the effect of the (actual
ducing an endogenous trade liberalization. On the and anticipated) trade liberalization.
other hand, increased aid should raise disposable
income and therefore desired absorption, again de- Own funds. Extending the derivation of an equa-
pending in part on how permanent the increase is tion like (6-12) to the case of an own-funds scheme
expected to be; this would tend to raise the domestic is relatively straightforward. Since the costs of direct
relative price of imports and the parallel premium. smuggling are positive, imports that were previously
Table 6-3. OLS and instrumental variables estimation resultsfor equation (64)
Dependent variablee Parallel premium (PPREM)1
OLS IV2
1967-1988 1968-1988
1 2 3 4
CONSTANT 191.38 -259.94 -195.95 -285.31
(-2.27) (-2.69) (-1.39) (-2.47)
PPRTT.IEM 0.38 0.45 0.71 0.40
(1.49) (2.03) (1.41) (1.60)
d(M2/ tE) 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.27
(2.58) (2.82) (1.55) (2.32)
d(lPD,) 2.45 1.20 1.91 0.89
(2.16) (1.09) (0.76) (0.58)
d(RE,R) 3.32 0.80 6.13 0.48
(2.24) (0.69) (2.03) (0.37)
(M2/Et-1) -0.05 - -0.12 -
(-1.40) - (-1.60) -
IPDt-1 3.63 - 4.97 -
(3.03) - (2.74) -
REt,iR 2.46 3.08 2.56 3.17
(2.78) (3.09) (1.84) (4.26)
RBA3R 0.86 0.79 0.80 0.78
(Q1l)3 -14.73 16.76 8.67 14.78
(0.20)4 (0.12) (0.56)4 (0.14)4
Note: (t-statistics are in parenthesis) a.The data are in table 6-2. b. Instruments for d(REER)t and d(IPD)t are M2.Z, REERt. ,and lPDt-
2 (along with the other right-hand side variables, which are assumed to be predetermined; note that in the case of PPREMtI, this is only
valid if the disturbances are serially uncorrelated). c. Q is the Box-Pierce statistic for testing general serial correlation. For columns 3 and
4., the statistic reported is Q(10).
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own-funds scheme.24 Ignoring the cost of operating and V' (recall) is underinvoicing through the official
in the (still illegal) foreign exchange market, and ass- window. The statutory tariff rate tm and the enforce-
uming that expected penalties forunderinvoicingare ment variable vmu enter as determinants of te, and z
an increasing function of the ratio of underinvoicing enters through the arbitrage relationship q - te = z. The
to reported imports, there will be a perfectly elastic resulting reduced form can be written exactly as in
supply of imports through the own-funds window (6-12), although the parameters will differ reflecting
at the priceq- te = z, where teis the effective tariff paid the change in the supply function for imports fi-
on own-funds imports.2 The amount of own-funds nanced by unofficial foreign exchange.
imports will then be determined residually, as the One conclusion that emerges unambiguously in
difference between total import demand M, and the the current model is that introduction of an own-
amount of imports brought in through the official wi- funds scheme will raise the parallel premium consis-
ndow: MaU = M - (fVA+VU) /Pm.We therefore have tent with any given value of the private current
account surplus FD-FS, and therefore that it must
(6-13) IFD = PmMown + Vu = Pm* M (A, Z, te, y) - voff raise the steady state parallel premium, ceteris pari-
bus (since in the steady state FD-FS is fixed at zero).
= FD (A, z, tm, wu, (V'ff/Pm), y), The reasoning is straightforward: by reducing the
+ - - - + costs of import smuggling, an own-funds scheme
shifts out the supply of imports and drives down the
where A is aggregate expenditure, y is a vector of gap between the domestic price of imports and their
other variables influencingtheaggregate demand for international price at the official exchange rate (i.e., q
imports (e.g., government absorption of imports), falls). Total imports are therefore higher under the
Table 64. Data forparallelpremium regressions
Period PPREM MZE$ IPDOP REER TAXCINV TOT AID
1966 20.40 190.54 n.a. 97.61 49 96.8 81.49
1967 23.20 215.56 1.96 99.14 50 91.9 70.29
1968 16.20 253.93 2.86 105.99 47 93.0 68.71
1969 27.40 277.39 6.26 104.91 71 112.3 117.32
1970 46.30 310.74 5.02 101.22 53 106.5 105.52
1971 110.00 364.41 3.08 97.09 54 98.8 136.10
1972 115.60 432.56 0.17 91.83 75 95.3 191.48
1973 94.93 529.42 7.13 88.03 39 118.8 170.00
1974 96.00 624.69 11.21 92.94 35 107.9 148.87
1975 202.53 671.95 16.93 99.60 35 92.8 332.93
1976 145.07 834.52 0.25 93.02 27 126.3 331.65
1977 89.07 1048.58 -5.44 92.94 23 140.3 393.36
1978 58.46 1267.25 11.72 93.11 40 115.1 404.55
1979 64.21 1679.35 6.26 87.03 34 114.9 535.91
1980 223.89 2141.34 10.37 100.00 52 100.0 546.61
1981 192.59 2486.09 25.55 131.93 52 85.2 496.25
1982 204.70 2584.86 29.04 158.73 57 88.4 405.17
1983 301.40 2338.33 43.44 171.82 52 91.1 318.69
1984 286.63 1668.01 16.39 177.94 53 96.4 310.80
1985 809.13 2387.37 103.98 206.61 50 90.5 424.92
1986 248.04 972.73 94.50 113.12 43 103.0 447.41
1987 126.95 793.62 42.36 174.52 50 89.6 704.92
1988 84.00 702.24 33.79 49.83 46 94.3 818.79
1989 57.89 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: n.a. not available. PPREM=100*(U-E)/E is the end-of-the-year parallel premium in percentage points, with the unofficial and
official exchange rates U and E taken from table 2-1. M2E$ is the end-of-the-year M2 in TShs (source: IMF, IFS), deflated by the official
exchange rate. IDPOP=100*[(1 + i)(Et+i /Et)-(I + i)] is the uncovered interest parity differential, with i given by the London Eurodollar
deposit rate (source: IFS) and i by the Saving deposit rate in Tanzania (source: Bank of Tanzania). REER is the ratio of the Tanzanian CPI
to a trade-weighted average of WPIs of 8 major developed country partners (source: World Bank).
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own-funds scheme than previously, for a given sup- introduced, was an integrated policy package that
ply of official foreign exchange. Smuggled exports included a devaluation of the official rate, decanotr
must therefore rise to finance the higher imports if of some prices, and other policy actions. To the de-
the private current account surplus is to remain un- gree that the package was perceived as a signal of
changed. The only way this can occur is for the genuine policy reform, and thus of a prospective
parallel premium to rise.26 increase in the return on domestic real assets, it
would have tended to lower, rather than raise, the
Implementing the Extended Model parallel premium.
Finally, D83 is a dummy variable for the 1983
Table 6-3 shows the results of estimation of a ver- crackdown on "economic saboteurs"; its effect on the
sion of the extended model. The parallel premium is premium is theoretically uncertain. From the illegal
regressed on the portfolio determinants (imposing trade side, while a crackdown unambiguously re-
the condition that these operate only in the short run) duces the volume of illegal trade, it may either uaise
and on a subset of the flow detenninants in equation or lower the premium, since it simultaneously affecis
(6-12). The data are in table 6-4. TAXCINV corre- both the supply and the demand for illegal foreign
sponds to the inverse of tx in (6-12): it is the ratio of exchange. On theportfoliobalance side, a crackdcwn
the domestic producer price of coffee to the fob ex- impairs the liquidity of foreign exchange assets and
port price (converted to TShs).27 As discussed above, reduces their expected yield; both effects woukd tend
the effect of export taxes on the premium is theoreti- to lower the parallel premium.
cally ambiguous; a positive net effect would indicate Most of the variables have the expected sigs. Bth
(i) that coffee growers are actively adjusting the share portfolio determinants enter significantly, with rnag
of the crop sold through official channels in response nitudes generally close to those found in table 6-1.
to taxes and the parallel premium, and (ii) that these Of the flow detenninants, only the TOT comes in st-
adjustments are large enough to have macroeco- rongly, with the lagged TOT exerting a strong negat-
nomic implications. ive effect on the premium (as observed, for exa.mple,
TOT is the terms of trade; it enters (1) through the during and after the coffee boom). Lagged aid infio-
endogenous trade liberalization that follows an im- ws also lower the premium, although theeffectis not
provement in the balance of payments; (2) through a estimated precisely. The effect of lagged TOT and la-
direct valuation effect on the illegal trade deficit; (3) ged aid is consistent with a substantial endogencus
through resource movements in favor of exports and trade liberalization in response to balance Gf payttme-
away from imports; and (4) througheffects on aggre- nts improvements; this corroborates evidertce L inn
gate demand, depending on the savings response. import equations in Ndulu and Lipumba (19wo
The first three of these would be expected to lower The coefficient on the coffee tax variable is consi 4a-
the parallel premium; the third would raise it, to an ently negative but insignificant, implying tha; tIv
extent depending on the savings response. Overall, smuggling response is more than offset by an aggreg-
we expect a net negative effect. ate coffee supply response in the opposite direction.
AID is net official resource transfers in dollars; a While this finding does not rule out a macecono-
rise in AID should lower the premium both through mic role forcoffee smugglingin determiningthepar-
direct increases in illegal export flows (expatriate allel premium (cf. Donnelly and Mshomba (19s,I
housing, etc.) and through the endogenous trade who argue that up to 25 percent of the arabica coff@e
liberalization effect; it should raise the premium to crop has been smuggled to Kenya in some yeans'.,
the degree that it raises aggregate demand. Again, we suggests that the elasticity of smuggling supplv,
expect a negative effect on balance, although the low in the coffee sector, at least over the horc, Df
aggregate demand effect might be rather strong year.
given that changes in aid have a strong permanent The own-funds scheme appears to have raised v he
component. premium, ceteris paribus, as predicted by the m oce.
Own funds is a dummy variable for the period The magnitude of the increase, between 150 and 240
from 1984 to the end of the sample, during which the percentage points, is impressive, and suggests that
own-funds scheme was in operation. By the argu- the low elasticity of smuggling response indicated in
ments given above, we expect it to have a positive the coffee case may be a more general phenomenon.
effect on the premium, given the values of the other Moreobviously, theresultsindicatethatthelowering
variables. Interpretation of the estimated coefficient of the parallel premium since 1986 has been a func-
will be complicated, however, by the fact that the tion of other developments in policy and extemal
1984/85 budget, in which the own-funds policy was conditions, such as (i) cumulative depreciations of
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the official exchange rate that reduced the real stock On the policy side, the key issue regarding the
of domestic money, and (ii) large inflows of foreign unofficial foreign exchange market is unification.
aid, and not of the own-funds scheme itself. The resource allocation gains of a single an market-
Implementation of the extended model using an- determined exchange rate for commercial transac-
nual data is clearly problematic given the short sam- tions are well known, and do not require elaboration
ple. Nonetheless, while the results in table 6-3 should here. Holding aside the question of capital account
be interpreted with caution, they suggest that there liberalization, what are the prospects for adoption of
maybe significant payoff to furtherworkusing equa- an essentially market-determined official exchange
tion (6-12). rate for commercial transactions?
First, there is a fiscal impact of unification. Pinto
Conclusions (1987) has emphasized that if the government is a net
buyer of foreign exchange from the private sector,
This paper has taken a macroeconomic perspec- unification will worsen the real deficit and raise the
tive on the parallel foreign exchange market in Tan- inflation rate required to finance the fiscal deficit. Pr-
zania. We discussed the emergence and behavior of eliminary calculations we have made suggest that
a premium on foreign exchange over the period sin- Tanzania is on the favorable side of this calculation.
ce 1966, and presented some preliminary empirical Given the large inflows of aid being channeled by the
evidence on the determination of the premium. In Government, increases in the official exchange rate
this conclusion, we briefly discuss selected empiric- provide a fiscal bonus, lowering the fiscal deficit in
al and policy issues and the agenda for future work. domestic currency terms. Moreover, devaluation will
Tlhe results of the third section show that both po- improve the trade tax base, both by moving activity
rtfolio and trade factors are at work in determining from unofficial channels to official channels (a real
the parallel premium in Tanzania. They therefore devaluation is required here), and by the valuation
suggest that rises in the premium in the early 1980s effect of higher official exchange rate (since import
may have been in part due to the substantial moneta- tariffs are levied on the domestic value at the official
ry expansions that occurred starting in 1979. In the exchange rate). It therefore appears likely thatofficial
context of the model, however, the resulting rise in exchange rate adjustments in the course of unifica-
the premium should have raised the market-clearing tion will not contribute to inflation via the fiscal
domestic prices of imports and import-substitutes. channel.
But in this case, real moneybalances would not have Second, while unification through adoption of an
risen as dramatically as they did in 1979, with veloc- across-the-board floating exchange rate has been
ity falling by 40 percent (for both Ml and M2) and tried in other African countries, capital controls are
remaining at the lower level until 1984 (at which time likely to be in place in Tanzania for the foreseeable
it equally abruptly returned to trend). Surveys con- future. This means that a parallel rate will continue
ducted by Bevan, et al (1990) and Ndulu and Hyuha to exist, and that some amount of trade activity will
(1989) suggest that while official price indices did not take place at this rate. "Unification" therefore means
fully reflect transactions prices during the third sub- the removal of rationing of import licenses at the
period, the gaps are not large enough to explain the official rate, and the provision of a competitive offi-
fall in measured velocity. One of the important issues cial outlet for export proceeds, rather than the reduc-
for further investigation, therefore, is the impact of tion of the parallel premium to zero. Moreover, uni-
failure of market clearing on the behavior of the fication in this sense is a complex process, involving
parallel premium and its interaction with other mac- change in policy institutions and gradual adjustment
roeconomic variables. on the part of market participants. In this context, the
A second empirical issue has to do with handling parallel rate is likely to play an important allocative
the change in regime that occurred between 1984 and and signalling function for a long time to come.
1986. For familiar reasons, a major change in policy Characterizing the nature of this role is an important
regime should be expected to change the parameters part of our agenda.
of behavioral equations and reduced forms. The As a final observation, one of the most interesting
short sample, particularly after the regime change, aspects of the Tanzanian experience, and a potential
has prevented us from investigating this issue care- lesson for other countries similarly situated, is the
fully; one possible avenue for future work is to im- role of the own-funds scheme. The de facto disman-
plement simple versions of the model using quar- tling of the QR-dominated trade regime through the
terly data (which are available for prices, interest own-funds policy resulted in a significant inflow of
rates, money stocks and exchange rates). consumer and intermediate imports, providing in-
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centives to farmers to increase production, and chan- for July, 1970 to March, 1986 and -0.041 for April, 1986 to
neling scarce spare parts and transport equipment to December, 1989.
industry and agriculture. The resulting supply re- 6. Starting in 1955, the Board was allowed to issue
sponse was significant. This, coupled with the price currency against government securities. By the end of
alignment to reflect scarcity values in virtually all 1%5, however, 82.5 percent of the currency issue was still
commodities (brought about by the de facto trade backed by sterling.
liberalization itself and the price decontrol), implied 7. The Tanzanian government decided not to follow the
that the official devaluations initiated in 1986 did not devaluation of sterling in 1967. Arguments given then
result in an acceleration of inflation, even though about the inefficacyof devaluationintheTanzaniancontext
there was a marked increase in money supplygrowth became an established part of the policy canon until the
during the 1987 to 1989 period. The success of the mid-1980s.
own-funds scheme suggests that carefully identified 8. A second policy development in 1978 with possible
policies linking the parallel market for foreign ex- implications for the balance of payments was the amend-
change with the official economy can provide a sig- ment of the Bank of Tanzania Act, which abolished the
nificant supply response and price alignment imme- previous limit of 25 percent of recurrent revenue on gov-
diately preceding the adoption of politically contro- enment borrowing from the Central Bank (Ndulu and
versial structural adjustment efforts. Hyuha 1989). It is not clear, however, that this represented
a genuine loosening of fiscal constraints, since parastatals
Notes had always been able to borrow from the National Bank of
Commerce (itself a parastatal), and the National Bank of
1. The parallel foreign exchange market in Tanzania is Commerce from the Bank of Tanzania.
an illegal or 'black' market. We use the terms 'unofficial' 9. The border was re-opened in 1984. The effect of the
and "parallel interchangeably in this paper, although the border closure on the parallel premium is ambiguous, since
latter term is broader and in some countries refers to a legal, it should raise the cost of both import smuggling (thus
officially recognized market. reducing the demand for illegal foreign exchange) and
2. Similar schemes have been operated in Ghana and export smuggling (thus reducing the supply of foreign
The Sudan in recent years. exchange). The theoretical model in the third section cap-
3. Ndulu and Hyuha (1989) give three reasons why the tures the effects of macroeconomic and regulatory changes
share of licenses may underestimate the true share: (1) on the parallel premium.
own-funds consignments under TShs 10,000 (approxi- 10. The National Price Commission existed from 1973 to
mately USD 50) do not require licenses, (2) the utilization 1984. By the mid 1970s, it controlled some 2000 prices of
rate of own-funds licenses is considerably higher than that imported and domestically produced goods. Prices were
of licenses accompanied by official foreign exchange; and decontrolled starting in 1984; only 12 commodities re-
(3) the incentive to underinvoice own-funds imports to mained under price control by July, 1988.
avoid customs duties is much stronger than for officially 11. The fiscal developments largely accounted for the
financed imports, since the cost of foreign exchange on the government's failure to meed performance criteria associ-
underinvoiced portion is identical to that on the declared ated with IMF borrowings in the 1979-80. The absence of
portion. IMF support meant an additional shock to external funds.
4. The World Currency Yearbook publishes monthly data 12. Ndulu (1987) gives a chronicle of official responses
from July 1970 (with annual observations back to 1966). to the external crisis starting in 1979; there were three
The series used in this paper is the World Currency Yearbook unsuccessful short-term government/IMF ventures in
series up to January 1984, and the Maliyamkono and Ba- 1979-80, and then the unsuccessful government three-year
gachwa (1990) series thereafter. While the two series move Structural Adjustment Program starting in June 1982.
closely together for most of the period since 1984, an excep- 13. The system is saddle-path stable; in each period, the
tion occurs in 1985, when the World Currency Yearbook parallel premium jumps to clear the asset market, and the
shows a stabilization of the parallel rate in contrast to the resulting incentives for illegal trade determine the flow
trend depreciation reported by Maliyamkono and addition to private foreign exchange holdings. Dornbusch
Babachwa. We use the latter series based on our own et al (1986) and Rocha (1990) give a diagrammatic analysis.
observations during that period, and consultation with 14. See also Rocha (1990) for an application to Algeria,
other observers, who unanimously regarded the World and Fishelson (1988) for an application of the model to 19
Currency Yearbook data for 1985 as anomalous. developing countries. Fishelson uses the uncovered differ-
5. The trends are calculated by regressing the monthly ential at the unofficial rate, on the argument that
parallel premium on a constant and a trend over the period movements in the unofficial rate provide a good proxy for
in question. The coefficients on the trend term are 0.0091 expected movements in the official rate. Neither of these
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papers makes a distinction between the dynamic effects of tic price of exportables will equal the producer price. No-
the portfolio deterninants and those of the flow determi- tice that the same is not true on the import side; there, the
nants. relevant marginal price for imports is the unofficial ex-
iS. The dependent variable actually used in the regres- change rate (plus the costs of smuggling), because
sions is the parallel premium, defined as 100*(U-E)/E, exchange controls act like an import quota and imply that
where U and E are the unofficial and official exchange rates, the marginal source of imports is illegal activity.
respectively, rather than In z = In (U/E) as defined in the 21. The real exchange rate for exports is usually defined
texf. as the domestic price of nontradables relative to exports.
16. Assuming market participants have rational expec- We use the CPI relative to the export price to capture the
tations, the forecast error will be uncorrelated with resource puII away from exportables production more
variables observed at time t or earlier. We therefore can use comprehensively.
3agged values of the right-hand side variables as instru- 22. The domestic price premium q falls towards tm, the
nents for the interest parity deviation. We also instrument tariff rate, as the official foreign exchange allocation rises.
for he change in the real exchange rate, on the grounds that For sufficiently high tariffs and liberal foreign exchange
the irrent real exchange rate is jointly determined with allocations, the implicit quota on imports becomes non-
:1he parallel premium. We treat the nominal money stock binding, and imports become a legally traded good on the
and ` he official exchange rate as predetermined. margin. We then have q = tn,, and aggregate absorption is
17. This interpretation of equation (4) reflects a back- no longer a determinant of q.
ward-uooking interpretation of the dynamic adjustment 23. One could also make Mff an increasing function of
towards the steady state. In reality, the system formed by q and z, on the argument (suggested earlier) that official
'I' ard (3) has both a stable and an unstable root, so that foreign exchange allocations may respond to rent-seeking
the rational expectations solution for z takes the form behavior. This does not affect the signs of the derivatives
dtd2f = alzt - zbart], 0 < a < 1, where zbart is a function of in (10) provided that the effect of q on foreign exchange
curTent and expected future levels of the flow determinants allocations is not large enough to offset the positive effect
amd chlanges in the stock determinants of the parallel pre- of q on z through the incentive to smuggle.
mium. Since future values of these variables must be 24. Provided, that is, that the authorities credibly com-
lirected based on current information, however, the final mit not to scrutinize the source of funds. This does appear
so uiton for z would include a distributed lag on current to have been the case in Tanzania. Informal sources sug-
and past values of the determinants, as in equation (4). gest that surveillance on the own-funds window has been
'-. The exact form of the smuggling function depends extremely loose in general.
on the costs associated with the illegal activity. While our 25. Note that importsbrought in through the own-funds
io7inulafion is fairly general, we have made one key sim- window are fully financed at the parallel exchange rate,
plification in assuming that the costs of smuggling are regardless of the degree of underinvoicing chosen by the
ultinately denominated in foreign exchange: this implies importer. The incentive to underinvoice is therefore
that only the parallel premium, and not the level of the stronger for own-funds importers than for importers using
official exchange rate, will directly affect smuggling incen- the official window, since in the latter case an increase in
ti -es. underinvoicing raises the trader's costs by increasing the
s c. Smuggling profits are equal to Rs = PmMs - U[M5 + share of the import that must be financed at the parallel
C 'fvl), where C(Ms) is the smuggling cost function. The rate. The effective tariff in the own-funds case will there-
first-order condition is C'(Ms) = (q-z)/(1+z), yielding a fore be below that on officially financed imports, ceteris
smuggling function Ms(q,z) with the properties given. Un- paribus. In the Tanzanian case, this difference is exacer-
der(or over)invoicing profits are given by Ru = batedbythegenerallaxityofsurveillanceofgoodscoming
Pm:[(XA°F+VU)/Pm*J - E(1+t)Voff - U(VU+c(v)Voff) = {(q-t) - in through the own-funds window.
<-zAv.* (1+z)c(v)}EWf (we have assumed that the invoic- 26. Notice the importance of our assumption that the
rin cost function is homogeneous of degree one in Vu and costs of import smuggling are independent of the costs of
Va 3,. Given t.ff, the first-order condition for v is similar export smuggling. If import and export smuggling were
-o the smuggling case: c'(v) = (q-z)/(1+z). This yields the joint activities, then an own-funds scheme might not drive
invoicing function Vu = VU(q,z)Vff given in equation (5). out all import smuggling. The assumption that smuggling
20. We use the real official exchange rate as the relative costs are private costs is also important; if the cost of
price influencing export supply decisions under the as- smuggling were a loss of some portion of the good being
surnption that peasants continue to voluntarily sell some smuggled, then theown-funds scheme would represent an
portion of their export crop to the marketing authorities improvement in the economy's marginal terms of trade
rather than selling it on the parallel market. In this case, and therefore in the productivity of a unit of illegal exports
aibitrage between the two markets implies that the domes- in generating imports, In this case, while an own-funds
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scheme would raise total imports, it is an empirical ques- Correction Approach to Money Demand: The Case of the
tion whether this would require an increase in the flow of Sudan', Journal of Development Economics.
illegal exports, and thus in the premium (we are grateful to Donnelly, Lawrence P. and Richard Mshomba (1987), *The
K. Krumm for pointing this out). Smuggling of Coffee: The Case of Kenya and Tanzania",
27. We use an average ratio for arabica and rubusta, mimeo, presented at November 1987 annual meeting of
calculated by taking the ratio of payments to producers for the African Studies Association.
the two types of coffee to the total fob export value of the Edwards, Sebastian (1990), Real Exchange Rates, Deval-
two types. For data availability reasons, we use the ad- uation and Adjustment: Exchange Rate Policy in Devel-
vance price for coffee. oping Countries (Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT
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